USA v. Bahadir Yahsi by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-11-2013 
USA v. Bahadir Yahsi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Bahadir Yahsi" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 1569. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1569 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 13-2196 
________________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
BAHADIR YAHSI,  
 
Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-11-cr-00353-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 and O’CONNOR,* Associate Justice (Ret.) 
 
(Opinion filed:   December 11, 2013) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION   
________________ 
 
                                              
*
 Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, sitting by designation. 
 
2 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
I. 
Appellant Bahadir Yahsi is a Turkish citizen living in the United States.  From 
2009 until his arrest in 2011, he engaged in numerous drug transactions with a 
Government cooperator, Mile Petkovski.
1
  In January 2012, a grand jury returned a five-
count second superseding indictment charging Yahsi with: conspiracy to distribute and to 
possess with intent to distribute oxycodone and ecstasy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 846; distribution and possession with intent to distribute 
oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 
three counts of distribution and possession with intent to distribute ecstasy, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  The drug trafficking charges 
are classified as “aggravated felonies” under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) and mandate permanent removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A); id. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013).    
Yahsi filed a motion to dismiss the second superseding indictment on double 
jeopardy grounds, arguing that the conspiracy count of the indictment was identical to a 
conspiracy charged by the State of New Jersey.
2
  The District Court denied the motion, 
                                              
1
 In 2009, Petkovski pleaded guilty to an unrelated conspiracy to distribute ecstasy and 
agreed to cooperate with the Government.  He subsequently communicated with Ilkay 
Guner, a former acquaintance and alleged drug dealer, who connected Petkovski with 
Yahsi.   
 
2
 In December 2010, a New Jersey state grand jury returned an indictment charging Yahsi 
and 26 other individuals with drug-trafficking offenses, including two counts alleging 
that, from February through April 2010, Yahsi conspired with others to distribute 
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and a panel of our Court affirmed on interlocutory appeal.  We explained that Yahsi 
could not meet his prima facie burden of making a non-frivolous showing of double 
jeopardy because 
the charged conspiracies took place in different locations,  there is a one-
month gap and thus no temporal overlap between the two conspiracies, 
there cannot be significant overlap in personnel because only one 
potentially overlapping individual (besides Yahsi himself) has been 
identified, and the overt acts cannot be the same since they occurred at 
different times. 
 
United States v. Yahsi, 490 F. App’x 476, 477 (3d Cir. 2012).  Concluding the 
conspiracies to be separate offenses, we did not address whether the dual sovereignty 
doctrine would also preclude Yahsi’s claim of double jeopardy.    
Following this Court’s decision, Yahsi offered to plead guilty, though to 
misdemeanor offenses rather than to the felonies charged in the second superseding 
indictment.  Through counsel, Yahsi acknowledged the automatic immigration 
consequences for the felonies charged and sought to plead to lesser offenses to avoid 
mandatory removal.  The Government rejected Yahsi’s plea offers.  He argues on appeal 
that, under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Government had a duty to 
negotiate in good faith toward a disposition that did not require removal, which it 
violated by rejecting his plea offers without explanation.         
After a December 2012 trial, the jury found Yahsi guilty of all five counts.  He 
next moved for a judgment of acquittal and argued, among other things, that the 
conspiracy charge in the second superseding indictment violated his double jeopardy 
                                                                                                                                                  
oxycodone and ecstasy in Clifton, New Jersey.  United States v. Yahsi, 490 F. App’x 476, 
477 (3d Cir. 2012).   
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right not to be charged again for the same offense for which punishment had already been 
imposed.  The District Court denied the motion, explaining that our Court previously held 
that the two conspiracies were separate offenses, and, moreover, as a separate sovereign 
the federal government was entitled to prosecute Yahsi for offenses arising out of the 
same events that gave rise to the New Jersey prosecution.  Yahsi now renews his 
argument that the conspiracy charge violates double jeopardy.         
In preparation for sentencing, the probation office calculated a Guidelines range of 
51 to 63 months.  Yahsi challenged this at his sentencing hearing and argues that he 
deserved a downward adjustment for “acceptance of responsibility,” despite going to 
trial, because he had offered to plead guilty to lesser charges.  The District Court rejected 
this argument, explaining that the Government was not required to “give you the plea you 
want,” and that Yahsi was convicted after a “hard fought trial.”  The Court imposed a 51-
month term of imprisonment.  Yahsi appeals that sentence and argues that the District 
Court erred when it failed to reduce his sentence for “acceptance of responsibility.”3   
II. 
Yahsi first argues that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla, 559 U.S. at 
374-75, the prosecutor was obligated to plea bargain in good faith toward a plea that did 
not require removal, or at least explain to the District Court why such a plea could not be 
reached.  Neither Padilla nor any other authority imposes such an obligation on 
prosecutors.  See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977) (“[T]here is no 
                                              
3
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(a).  
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constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to 
trial.”); United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992).  While the 
immigration consequences to Yahsi are significant, the prosecutor was not required to 
entertain a plea to lesser charges solely because Yahsi would be removed if convicted of 
the crimes charged in the second superseding indictment.   
Yahsi also claims that the conspiracy charged in the second superseding 
indictment should have been dismissed because it is for the same underlying offense as a 
prior New Jersey state conviction and violates double jeopardy.  The District Court twice 
rejected this argument, and our Court has also denied the claim on interlocutory appeal.
4
  
The law is settled that “a federal prosecution arising out of the same facts which had been 
the basis of a state prosecution is not barred by the double jeopardy clause.”  United 
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1105 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases); see also Heath 
v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1985).  Regardless whether the offenses overlap, the 
state and federal prosecutions here could not give rise to double jeopardy.  See Pungitore, 
910 F.2d at 1105.   
Finally, Yahsi contends that the District Court erred in refusing to grant a two-
level reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” because he only went to trial after the 
prosecution refused his plea offer.
5
  Section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
                                              
4
 We exercise plenary review over claims of double jeopardy.  United States v. Aguilar, 
849 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1988). 
   
5
 “We review factual findings underlying the denial of a Sentencing Guidelines reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility for clear error, and reverse only if we are left with a 
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Guidelines provides that a district court may reduce a defendant’s offense level by two 
levels where he “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense . . . .”  
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2012).  Although “[c]onviction by trial . . . 
does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction,” its 
application is “rare.”  Id. cmt. n.2.  The defendant in those cases typically goes to trial “to 
assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional 
challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct),” and 
the district court’s determination whether the defendant accepted responsibility is “based 
primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct.”  Id.; see also United States v. DeLeon-
Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995).  
 The District Court did not clearly err when it determined that this case is not 
among those “rare” situations where a downward adjustment is warranted.  Indeed, the 
record reflects that Yahsi contested his guilt throughout the trial and during sentencing.  
Further, as the Court correctly found, Yahsi’s offer to plead to offenses lesser than those 
charged in the second superseding indictment did not demonstrate his acceptance of 
responsibility for the crimes charged.  See, e.g., United States v. McNeal, 29 F. App’x 
377, 382 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Makes Room For Them, 49 F.3d 410, 416 (8th 
Cir. 1995).  The District Court was well within its discretion to deny the reduction.          
*    *    *    *    * 
As there was no error by the District Court, we affirm. 
                                                                                                                                                  
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  United States v. 
Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2007). 
